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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Cynthia Marie Munson, a Certified Public Accountant (CPA) and the former Chief
Financial Officer (CFO) of Pioneer Title, was convicted of three counts of grand theft and
sentenced to an aggregate unified term of twenty years, with four years fixed, following a bench
trial. She appeals from her judgment of conviction, raising three issues on appeal.

First,

Ms. Munson contends the district court abused its discretion in allowing the State to introduce
evidence and testimony during its case-in-chief relating to a civil settlement agreement entered
into by Ms. Munson and Pioneer Title prior to the filing of the criminal charges, and to argue that
the agreement constituted consciousness of guilt. Second, Ms. Munson contends the district
court abused its discretion in not allowing her to introduce, in rebuttal, expert testimony
regarding a polygraph examination she took which indicated she was being truthful. Third,
Ms. Munson contends the district court abused its discretion when it sentenced her to a term of
incarceration considering the substantial mitigating factors that exist in this case and the
presentence investigator’s recommendation for probation.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Ms. Munson was an employee of Pioneer Title from August 1991 to July 2014, and
served as the CFO of Pioneer Title from January 2007 until May 2014. 1 (Tr., p.2175, Ls.22-24;
Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”), pp.9, 176.) In May 2014, Tina Hedin, an employee of
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Ms. Munson worked for Pioneer Holding Company, which served “as a sort of parent for the
various Pioneer Title Companies.” (Tr., p.2176, Ls.12-16; R., p.146.) There were up to 18
separate Pioneer Title Companies, and between 200 and 400 employees, during the time period
relevant to this case. (Tr. Vol. I, p.120, L.13 – p.121, L.2.) For ease of reference, all Pioneer
entities will be referred to in this Brief as Pioneer Title.
1

Pioneer Title who worked in payroll and human resources and reported to Ms. Munson, noticed
irregularities relating to Ms. Munson in the deferred compensation reports. (Tr., p.991, Ls.3-10,
p.996, Ls.2-6, p.1008, Ls.12-23; PSI, pp.176, 183.)

Upon further investigation, Ms. Hedin

determined certain advances were not being deducted from Ms. Munson’s end of the month
paychecks. (Tr., p.1008, L.12 – p.1009, L.24, p.1010, L.23 – p.1011, L.2; State’s Ex. 10.)
Ms. Hedin also determined Ms. Munson had “turned off” certain deductions, so that she was not
paying the employee portion of her benefits. (Id.) Ms. Hedin shared her concerns with Tim
Bundgard, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Pioneer Title, and told him Ms. Munson was
the only person who had access to the payroll system. (Tr., p.1009, L.25 – p.1010, L.10.)
Ms. Munson was placed on a leave of absence without pay. (Tr., p.1260, Ls.15-16; PSI, p.3.)
Pioneer Title hired Ryan Stratton to investigate the payroll irregularities. (R., p.90; PSI,
p.176.) Mr. Stratton conducted an investigation, though he did not conduct a forensic audit.
(4/28/17 Tr., p.27, L.8 – p.28, L.18.) When Pioneer Title confronted Ms. Munson with the
payroll irregularities, she was “stunned” and “didn’t know what to say.” (Tr., p.1257, Ls.6-8.)
She said it must have been a mistake, but if she owed this money, she would pay it back.
(Tr., p.1257, Ls.9-10; PSI, p.181.) Pioneer Title threatened to sue Ms. Munson for breach of
fiduciary duty, which could have required her to reimburse Pioneer Title for all of the
compensation she had received over the course of her employment. (Tr., p.1270, Ls.11-13,
p.1272, Ls.8-12; R., p.283.) After two months of negotiation through counsel, Ms. Munson
entered into a civil settlement agreement with Pioneer Title on July 16, 2014 (hereinafter, the
Agreement), pursuant to which she agreed to repay approximately $1.3 million to Pioneer Title
and to resign her position. (Tr., p.1262, Ls.2-4; R., p.90; PSI, pp.3, 176.) In exchange, Pioneer
Title agreed to waive any civil claims against Ms. Munson. (R., p.90.)
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Over three months after discovering the payroll irregularities, Pioneer Title contacted law
enforcement, and the State ultimately presented the case to the grand jury, in reliance on the
investigation conducted by Pioneer Title and Mr. Stratton. (Tr., p.1285, L.22 – p.1286, L.3.)
Ms. Munson was charged by Indictment with four counts, all pertaining to the time period from
January 1, 2011, to May 31, 2014. (R., pp.24-27.) In Count I, Grand Theft, the State alleged
Ms. Munson took payroll advances and did not deduct them from her end of the month payroll
check. (R., pp.24-25.) In Count II, Grand Theft By Deception, the State alleged Ms. Munson
failed to pay any portion of her health care benefits and failed to contribute to her employersponsored 401k, thus benefitting from Pioneer Title’s payment of its portion of her benefits and
its “matching” 401k contribution. (R., p.25.) In Count III, Grand Theft, the State alleged
Ms. Munson wrote three “discretionary bonus” checks to herself in amounts not approved by
Pioneer Title. (R., p.25.) At trial, the State introduced evidence that the unapproved checks
were for $30,000, $50,000 and $60,000. (R., p.970.) In Count IV, Forgery, the State alleged
Ms. Munson created and/or used a forged signature stamp bearing Mr. Bundgard’s signature to
pass checks without Mr. Bundgard’s knowledge or permission. (R., p.25.)
There were multiple discovery disputes in this case, and numerous pretrial motions filed
by both sides. After two continuances, Ms. Munson waived her right to a jury trial, and the case
was tried to the bench over the course of nine days in November and December 2016. (Tr., p.5.)
The parties submitted written closing arguments to the district court. (R., pp.933-1001, 101633.) The district court found Ms. Munson guilty of grand theft as charged in Counts I and III,
and grand theft by deception as charged in Count II. (R., pp.1044-45.) The district court found
Ms. Munson not guilty of forgery as charged in Count IV. (R., pp.1044-45.) On Count I, the
district court sentenced Ms. Munson to a unified term of fourteen years, with four years fixed.
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(R., p.1050; 4/28.17 Tr., p.68, L.18 – p.69, L.5.) On Count II, the district court sentenced
Ms. Munson to a unified term of fourteen years, with four years fixed, to be served concurrently.
(Id.) On Count III, the district court sentenced Ms. Munson to six years indeterminate, to be
served consecutively. (Id.)
The judgment of conviction was filed on June 6, 2017. (R., pp.1049-53.) Ms. Munson
filed a timely notice of appeal on July 17, 2017. (R., pp.1056-70.) On August 25, 2017,
Ms. Munson filed a motion to reduce her sentence pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35.
(R., pp.1074-76.) The district court denied the motion without a hearing.2 (R., pp.1077-80.)
Pioneer Title did not seek restitution from Ms. Munson, and no restitution was ordered.
(R., p.1083.)

2

Ms. Munson does not challenge on appeal the district court’s denial of her Idaho Criminal Rule
35 motion in light of State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007).
4

ISSUES
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by allowing the State to introduce evidence and
testimony relating to the Agreement during its case-in-chief and to argue at trial that the
Agreement constituted consciousness of guilt?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by not allowing Ms. Munson to introduce in
rebuttal evidence regarding a polygraph examination Ms. Munson took which indicated
she was being truthful?

III.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it sentenced Ms. Munson to an aggregate
unified term of twenty years, with four years fixed, considering the significant mitigating
factors that exist in this case?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Allowing The State To Introduce Evidence And
Testimony Relating To The Agreement During Its Case-In-Chief And To Argue At Trial That
The Agreement Constituted Consciousness Of Guilt
A.

Introduction
Prior to the filing of criminal charges, Ms. Munson and Pioneer Title entered into the

Agreement, pursuant to which Ms. Munson agreed to repay approximately $1.3 million to
Pioneer Title and to resign her position, and Pioneer Title agreed to waive any civil claims
against Ms. Munson. (Tr., p.1262, Ls.2-4; R., p.90; PSI, pp.3, 176.) The district court denied
Ms. Munson’s motion in limine under Idaho Rule of Evidence 408, and granted the State’s
motion to admit evidence under Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b), ruling the State could present
evidence and testimony relating to the Agreement during its case-in-chief, and could argue the
agreement constituted “consciousness of guilt.” (R., pp.361-62.) The district court abused its
discretion as its rulings are directly contrary to the language of Rules 404(b) and 408, under
which all evidence, testimony, and argument relating to the Agreement should have been
excluded.

B.

Standard Of Review
This Court reviews a decision on a motion in limine for an abuse of discretion. State v.

Richardson, 156 Idaho 524, 527 (2014). When a discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal,
the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court
correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the
boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific
choices before it; and (3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.
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State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 294, 298 (Ct. App. 2015). As demonstrated below, the district court
here did not act consistently with the legal standards applicable to the choices before it and did
not reach its decision by an exercise of reason. Accordingly, the district court abused its
discretion.

C.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion As Its Rulings Related To The Agreement Are
Directly Contrary To The Language Of Idaho Rules Of Evidence 404(b) and 408, Under
Which All Evidence, Testimony, And Argument Relating To The Agreement Should
Have Been Excluded
Ms. Munson filed a motion in limine before trial, asking the district court to prohibit the

State from introducing any evidence with respect to the Agreement and to prohibit the State from
arguing to the jury that the Agreement is an admission of guilt. (R., pp.86-88.) The State filed
an objection to Ms. Munson’s motion. (R., pp.161-68.) The State also filed a notice of intent to
admit evidence of the Agreement in its case-in-chief pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b),
which the district court construed as a motion. (R., pp.146-54, 157-58.) The district court
partially granted, and partially denied, Ms. Munson’s motion in limine. (R., p.361.) The district
court ruled the State “would be permitted to argue the agreement as consciousness of guilt” but
“would not be permitted to argue that defendant admitted guilt or wrongdoing as part of the civil
agreement because such an argument would misstate the agreement.” (R., p.361.) The district
court granted the State’s motion, finding “there was sufficient evidence from which a fact finder
could conclude that the acts occurred and that the evidence was relevant to a disputed issue other
than propensity.”

(R., p.362.)

The district court found the Agreement was relevant to

Ms. Munson’s consciousness of guilt. (R., p.362.)
At trial, counsel for Ms. Munson objected to any mention of the Agreement for lack of
foundation and relevance, but the district court reminded counsel of its pretrial ruling and
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overruled the objection. (Tr., p.1262, Ls.5-14.) Terry Copple, an attorney, testified during the
State’s case-in-chief regarding the legal services he provided to Pioneer Title with respect to
Ms. Munson. (Tr., p.1250, Ls.8-12, p.1253, Ls.10-14.) He testified as to the terms of the
Agreement and the negotiation of the Agreement. (Tr., p.1269, Ls.6-10, p.1270, Ls.11-13,
p.1272, Ls.8-12.) The State argued strenuously that the Agreement represented consciousness of
guilt, and was proof of the wrongfulness of the taking, which was, according to the State “[t]he
only part . . . that the defendant appears to dispute.” (R., p.934.) The State argued in closing
with respect to Count I:
The defendant intended to take all this money and she knew it. Mr. Copple
testified that once the defendant was caught, she requested a quick resolution
without a full forensic audit. Knowing exactly what she had done and also
knowing that a full forensic audit was likely to reveal much higher numbers, she
chose to repay Pioneer Holding $1,300,000.00 in restitution for the amount she
had stolen from them.
(R., p.951.) With respect to Count III, the State argued, “Furthermore, the defendant repaid
Pioneer Holding $1,300,000.00 . . . related to these [disputed bonus] checks.” (R., p.970.) In
rebuttal closing, the State argued as follows:
Terry Copple testified that during the negotiation of the civil settlement the
process took several months. He also testified that the defendant wanted a fast
resolution, not a full forensic audit. This was not an emotional reaction to enter
this settlement as the defendant seems to imply. This involved attorneys on both
sides coming to an agreeable resolution after lengthy negotiations about the
amount of money wrongfully taken from Pioneer Holding by the defendant . . . .
[The] evidence does not suggest that the ultimate settlement was an emotional
reaction to a baseless claim.
(R., pp.1019-19.)
The district court abused its discretion in allowing the State to introduce evidence and
testimony relating to the Agreement under Rule 404(b) because the Agreement was not evidence
of a prior bad act. Rule 404(b) states in pertinent part that “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or
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other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular
occasion the person acted in accordance with the character” but “may be admissible for another
purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” In determining whether prior bad act evidence is
admissible, the first question for the court to consider is “whether there is sufficient evidence to
establish the prior bad acts as fact.” State v. Pokorney, 149 Idaho 459, 462 (Ct. App. 2010).
Here, the fact that the parties entered into the Agreement does not establish as fact any prior bad
act on the part of Ms. Munson. Thus, the fact that prior bad act evidence can be admitted for
showing knowledge or consciousness of guilty, see State v. Sheehan, 139 Idaho 267, 279 (2003),
is of no consequence.
The State argued the Agreement was “relevant to showing that the taking was wrongful.”
(R., pp.152-53.) The State argued that “[w]hen the jury hears that the defendant, a CPA, agreed
to repay approximately $1,300,000.00 to the victim after being caught, the jury could then make
the logical inference that the defendant knew of the theft.” (R., p.153.) Counsel for Ms. Munson
argued the Agreement was not relevant to whether the taking was wrongful as it specifically
states Ms. Munson is consenting to indebtedness to Pioneer Title for purposes of civil settlement,
and is not admitting to any wrongdoing. (R., p.286.) Counsel for Ms. Munson argued “the
threat of civil litigation with a lower burden of proof and a negligence standard, was the impetus
of the settlement, not criminal prosecution.” (R., pp.286-87.) Counsel for Ms. Munson was
correct.
The fact that Ms. Munson agreed to pay Pioneer Title back for money she improperly
received has absolutely no bearing on whether she knew of the improper receipt of funds at the
time, which was the critical issue in this case. Ms. Munson’s receipt of the funds was not the
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supposed prior bad act—it was Ms. Munson’s intent that was the supposed bad act, and the fact
of the Agreement does not establish that prior bad act as fact. As other courts have recognized,
“[T]he decision by a party to a civil suit to enter into a settlement is typically based upon
consideration of more than just the strength of the legal claims. Other factors, such as a desire to
avoid protracted and complex litigation or negative publicity, can be just as important, or more,
to a party’s decision to settle.” State v. Finch, 465 S.W.3d 584, 605 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2013).
The district court also abused its discretion in denying Ms. Munson’s motion to prohibit
the State from referencing the Agreement under Rule 408. Rule 408 states:
(a)

Prohibited Uses. Evidence of the following is not admissible--on behalf of
any party--either to prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed
claim or to impeach by a prior inconsistent statement or a contradiction:
(1)

(2)

(b)

furnishing, promising, or offering--or accepting, promising to
accept, or offering to accept--a valuable consideration in
compromising or attempting to compromise the claim; and
conduct or a statement made during compromise negotiations
about the claim. Compromise negotiations encompass mediation.

Exceptions. The court may admit this evidence for another purpose, such
as proving a witness’s bias or prejudice, negating a contention of undue
delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or
prosecution. This rule does not require the exclusion of any evidence
otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the course of
compromise negotiations.

Rule 408(a) provides, as the general rule, that furnishing valuable consideration in compromising
a disputed claim is not admissible to prove the validity or amount of the claim. None of the
exceptions in Rule 408(b) are relevant here. The State did not seek to admit evidence of the
Agreement to prove bias or prejudice, to negate a contention of undue delay, or to prove an effort
to object a criminal investigation or prosecution. On the contrary, the State sought to introduce
evidence of the Agreement to show Ms. Munson’s taking of money from Pioneer Title was
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wrongful. (R., pp.152-53.)

This is a prohibited use under Rule 408(a), and the district court

abused its discretion in ruling to the contrary.
To the extent that the question has not been resolved in Idaho, this Court should hold that
evidence of compromise of civil liability should be excluded in both civil proceedings and
related criminal prosecutions because such a policy promotes settlement of civil disputes.
Nothing in Rule 408 states that it is inapplicable to criminal proceedings, and the Idaho Rules of
Evidence generally apply to both civil and criminal proceedings. See I.R.E. 101 (stating the
Idaho Rules of Evidence “govern all cases and proceedings in the courts of the State of Idaho”
except with certain exceptions not relevant here). Moreover, the plain language of Rule 408,
which allows evidence of compromise to be used to prove obstruction of criminal investigation
or prosecution, implies the applicability of the rule in criminal proceedings.
As other courts have recognized, “the potential prejudicial effect of the admission of
evidence of a settlement can be more devastating to a criminal defendant than to a civil litigant.”
United States v. Bailey, 327 F.3d 1131, 1146 (10th Cir. 2003); see also United States v. Hays,
872 F.2d 582, 589 (5th Cir. 1989) (recognizing that the framers of Federal Rule of Evidence
“clearly contemplated” that “the potential impact of evidence regarding a settlement agreement
with regard to a determination of liability is profound” and stating “[i]t does not tax the
imagination to envision the juror who retires to deliberate with the notion that if the defendants
had done nothing wrong, they would not have paid the money back”); State v. Gano, 988 P.2d
1153, 1160 (Haw. 1999) (“[W]e believe that the potential impact of evidence regarding
a civil settlement agreement is even more profound in criminal proceedings than it is
in civil proceedings.”). The application of Rule 408 to all proceedings, civil and criminal, serves
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the exact purpose for which the rule was created, which is to encourage the effective negotiation
of civil claims.
The district court did not act consistently with Idaho Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 408
and did not reach its decision that the State could present evidence and testimony relating to the
Agreement during its case-in-chief, and could argue the agreement constituted “consciousness of
guilt,” by an exercise of reason. The district court should have excluded all evidence, testimony,
and argument relating to the Agreement.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Not Allowing Ms. Munson To Introduce In Rebuttal
Expert Testimony Regarding A Polygraph Examination Ms. Munson Took Which Indicated She
Was Being Truthful In Her Denials Of Wrongdoing
A.

Introduction
After the charges in this case were filed, Ms. Munson took a polygraph examination, and

the examiner, Dale Rodgers, concluded Ms. Munson was being truthful when she denied making
and using an unauthorized signature stamp, and denied issuing herself unauthorized bonus
checks in December 2013. (PSI, pp.68-74.) The district court granted the State’s motion in
limine, and denied Ms. Munson’s motion to reconsider, ruling Ms. Munson could not present
expert testimony from Mr. Rodgers or other evidence regarding the polygraph examination to
rebut evidence regarding her consciousness of guilt. (R., pp.768-69.) The district court abused
its discretion in excluding the polygraph evidence because the purpose of this evidence was not
simply to bolster Ms. Munson’s credibility, but to rebut evidence regarding her consciousness of
guilt. This evidence would have helped the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine
a fact in issue, and should have been admitted, especially in light of the district court’s pre-trial
rulings allowing the State to introduce evidence, testimony and argument about the Agreement.
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B.

Standard Of Review
This Court reviews a decision on a motion in limine for an abuse of discretion.

Richardson, 156 Idaho at 527.

When a discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the

appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine:

(1) whether the lower court

correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the
boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific
choices before it; and (3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.
Hedger, 115 Idaho at 298. As demonstrated below, the district court here did not act consistently
with the legal standards applicable to the choices before it and did not reach its decision by an
exercise of reason. Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion.

C.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Excluding The Polygraph Evidence Proffered
By Ms. Munson Under Perry Because Ms. Munson Was Not Seeking To Admit The
Evidence Simply To Bolster Her Credibility, But To Rebut Evidence Regarding Her
Consciousness Of Guilt
Prior to trial, the State filed a motion in limine asking the district court to prohibit the

defense from calling Mr. Rogers at trial to testify regarding Ms. Munson’s polygraph
examination “because his testimony would not be relevant.” (R., pp.751-52.) The State cited
State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520 (2003), for the proposition that a polygraph examination is not
admissible at trial to vouch for the credibility of a witness. (R., pp.751-52.) Ms. Munson filed an
objection to the State’s motion, arguing the polygraph evidence was relevant, and should be
permitted in rebuttal. (R., pp.755-57.) The district orally ruled the polygraph evidence “is
inadmissible,” but invited counsel for Ms. Munson to submit additional legal authority
supporting her position. (Tr., p.645, L.24 – p.646, L.1; p.646, L.23 – p.647, L.12.) After the
hearing, Ms. Munson filed a motion in limine, which the district court construed as a motion to
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reconsider, citing additional authority and asking the district court to permit the defense to
introduce evidence of the polygraph examination to rebut evidence of Ms. Munson’s
consciousness of guilt. (R., pp.768-69.) The district court denied the motion to reconsider.
(Tr., p.664, Ls.4-20.)
The district court did not act consistently with the legal standards applicable to the
choices before it and did not reach its decision by an exercise of reason. The district court
concluded its decision was controlled by Perry, but failed to recognize the compelling
differences between the polygraph evidence at issue here and in Perry. The district court should
have looked to the lead case on the admission of expert testimony, Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and should have concluded the expert testimony
proffered here was admissible under that case and Idaho Rule of Evidence 702, notwithstanding
the Court’s holding in Perry.
In Daubert, the United States Supreme Court provided guidance to the federal courts
regarding the admissibility of expert testimony. 509 U.S. 579. The Court explained that,
“[f]aced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony . . . the trial judge must determine at the
outset . . . whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist
the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue.” Id. at 592. The vast majority of
courts that have considered the issue have held that Daubert overruled the per se rule excluding
polygraph evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Rouse, 329 F.Supp.2d 1077, 1083 (D.S.D. 2004),
affirmed, 410 F.3d 1005 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, 228 (9th Cir.
1997); United States v. Call, 129 F.3d 1402, 1404 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Posado, 57
F.3d 428, 431-34 (5th Cir.1995).
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In Perry, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court, holding the
defendant could not introduce expert witness testimony regarding the results of his polygraph
test in his trial for second-degree murder. 139 Idaho at 521. During the polygraph examination,
the defendant denied shooting the victim or arranging for his death, and testified that, as far as he
knew, the victim shot himself. Id. The Court excluded the polygraph evidence under the
relevance portion of the Daubert inquiry. The Court held that “[e]ven if there is sufficient
evidence to find that the polygraph testing is supported by appropriate validation in this case,
there was no showing by the district court of how this polygraph opinion would assist the trier of
fact to understand or determine a fact in issue.” Id. at 524-25. The Court noted that “Idaho
courts have routinely held that an expert’s opinion, in a proper case, is admissible up to the point
where an expression of opinion would require the expert to pass upon the credibility of witnesses
or the weight of disputed evidence. To venture beyond that point, however, is to usurp the jury’s
function.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court concluded: “The polygraph
results in this case do not help the trier of fact to find facts or to understand the evidence as
required by I.R.E. 702. To admit these results is an attempt to substitute the credibility
determination appropriate for the jury, with [the expert’s] interpretation of the alleged
involuntary physiological results from the polygraph examination.” Id.
The present case is distinguishable from Perry as there is a difference between evidence
offered to vouch for credibility and evidence offered to show subjective consciousness of
innocence. The polygraph examination at issue here was entirely different than the polygraph
examination at issue in Perry. Ms. Munson acknowledged the existence of the payroll errors at
issue in this case, and did not contest the validity of the disputed bonus checks or the existence of
the allegedly fraudulent signature stamp.

The sole question for determination at trial was
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whether Ms. Munson acted with the requisite criminal intent.

The polygraph test showed

Ms. Munson was being truthful in her denials. This evidence would have helped the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, and thus should have been admitted
under Idaho Rule of Evidence 702.
A factually analogous case is United States v. Galbraith, 908 F. Supp. 877 (D.N.M.
1995). In Galbraith, the federal district court granted the defendant’s pretrial motion to allow
expert testimony regarding the results of his polygraph examination, concluding the evidence
was sufficiently reliable and relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Id. at 895-96. The
State alleged the defendant intentionally filed income tax returns which under-reported his
income, and the “sole issue [was] whether the willful mens rea existed, i.e., whether [the
defendant] knew that his income tax returns omitted taxable income which should have been set
forth on the forms.” Id. at 878. The district court concluded the proffered polygraph evidence
was relevant, as it would assist the trier of fact. Id. at 895. The court explained: “A critical
issue in this case is whether [the defendant] knowingly failed to report certain items of income
on his income tax returns. [The polygraph examiner’s] testimony that [the defendant’s] answers
to the relevant questions regarding his knowledge and intent are consistent with a truthful
polygraph outcome, is pertinent to this issue.” Id.
At a minimum, the district court should have allowed the defense to introduce evidence
of Ms. Munson’s willingness to take a polygraph test, even if it excluded the test results itself, as
circumstantial evidence of consciousness of innocence. In State v. Santana-Lopez, 613 N.W.2d
918 (Wis. App. 2000), the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin concluded the district court abused its
discretion in ruling the defendant’s state of mind in offering to undergo DNA testing was not
relevant to the charge of first-degree sexual assault. Id. at 922. The court explained that,

16

“[s]imply put, an offer to undergo DNA testing, like an offer to take a polygraph examination,
may reflect a consciousness of innocence.” Id. at 921. Similarly, in Murphy v. Cincinnati Ins.
Co., 772 F.2d 273 (6th Cir. 1985), the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held the district court did
not err in permitting the insured to testify about his willingness to undergo a polygraph
examination because it reflected upon his credibility and was thus relevant to the insurance
claim.
The district court abused its discretion in excluding the expert polygraph testimony in this
case for lack of relevance.

Pursuant to the authority cited above, evidence of subjective

consciousness of innocence is relevant to show a lack of guilty knowledge. This case is not
controlled by Perry, and the district court abused its discretion in granting the State’s motion and
denying Ms. Munson’s motion to reconsider. It was particularly important for Ms. Munson to
present the polygraph evidence in rebuttal in light of the district court’s ruling that the State
could argue the Agreement constituted evidence of Ms. Munson’s guilt.

III.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sentenced Ms. Munson To An Aggregate
Unified Term Of Twenty Years, With Four Years Fixed, Considering The Significant Mitigating
Factors That Exist In This Case
A.

Introduction
Prior to this case, Ms. Munson had never been charged with or convicted of a crime. She

had, by all accounts, led a productive life and contributed greatly to her family and her
community. The presentence investigator determined Ms. Munson presented a low risk to
reoffend, and recommended probation.

Friends, family, and colleagues of Ms. Munson

submitted numerous letters to the district court attesting to Ms. Munson’s character, and
requesting leniency. The district court nonetheless sentenced Ms. Munson to an aggregate
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unified term of twenty years, with four years fixed, for crimes for which Ms. Munson provided
full financial compensation. The sentence the district court imposed upon Ms. Munson was not
reasonable considering the nature of her offenses, her character, and the protection of the public
interest, and was thus an abuse of discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
Where the sentence imposed by the district court is within statutory limits, “the appellant

bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.” State v. Miller, 151
Idaho 828, 834 (2011) (quoting State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 875 (2011)). “When a trial
court exercises its discretion in sentencing, ‘the most fundamental requirement is
reasonableness.’” Id. (quoting State v. Hooper, 119 Idaho 606, 608 (1991)). “A sentence is
reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and
to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution.” Id. (citation
omitted).

“When reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence this Court will make an

independent examination of the record, ‘having regard to the nature of the offense, the character
of the offender and the protection of the public interest.’” Id. (quoting State v. Shideler, 103
Idaho 593, 594 (1982)).

C.

The Sentence The District Court Imposed Upon Ms. Munson Was Not Reasonable
Considering The Nature Of Her Offenses, Her Character, And The Protection Of The
Public Interest
The sentence the district court imposed upon Ms. Munson was not reasonable

considering the nature of her offenses. Ms. Munson’s offenses were certainly serious. They
were a violation of the trust that had been placed in her by Pioneer Title based on her role as a
CPA and CFO. Ms. Munson caused financial harm to a local company that is involved in real
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estate transactions impacting almost all of us. But Ms. Munson’s offenses, though found by the
district court to be intentional, did not warrant a term of incarceration. They did not impact the
success of Pioneer Title, which did well financially despite Ms. Munson’s actions, and which
remains a strong and successful company to this day.
Most importantly, Ms. Munson fully compensated Pioneer Title for any loss that it
suffered as a result of her crimes. In fact, it appears Ms. Munson paid more to Pioneer Title than
she actually owed.

Denise McLure, a CPA and certified fraud examiner, testified at

Ms. Munson’s sentencing hearing that the total amount of loss established by Pioneer Title as a
result of Ms. Munson’s actions was $884,000, though Ms. Munson paid $1.3 million to Pioneer
Title prior to the criminal charges being filed. (4/28/17 Tr., p.23, Ls.12-20, p.31, L.9 – p.33,
L.10.) Counsel for Ms. Munson asked to the district court to “show compassion to a woman who
has led an admirable, law-abiding life” and “who has repaid Pioneer Title all that they have
asked her to, which by the calculations we have is nearly 50 percent more than what she actually
received.”

(4/28/17 Tr., p.62, Ls.4-9.)

The district court did not show compassion to

Ms. Munson and imposed a sentence that was not reasonable considering the nature of her
offenses.
The sentence the district court imposed upon Ms. Munson was also not reasonable
considering her character. Ms. Munson was 56 years old at the time of sentencing. (PSI, p.13.)
She graduated from the University of Idaho, with a degree in business accounting, and has been
gainfully employed her entire life. (PSI, p.8.) Even after leaving Pioneer Title, she worked as an
accountant, and then began her own consulting firm, prior to being incarcerated following
sentencing in this case. (PSI, p.65.) Despite knowing about Ms. Munson’s conviction, the
person who employed Ms. Munson as an accountant after she left Pioneer Title still described
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her as potentially employable in the future, in a supervised roll with “good internal accounting
controls” and with “checks and balances.” (PSI, p.65.)
Ms. Munson is happily married, and is the mother of two daughters, ages 17 and 20 at the
time of sentencing. (PSI, p.7.) Ms. Munson expressed to the district court at sentencing her
commitment to her family. She said, “I am so fearful of losing the only thing that matters most,
my family . . . . I pray and hope that you can see the person I really am. And I beg for leniency
so that I can try to have a life with my family here and be here to help my girls not give up.”
(4/28/17 Tr., p.65, Ls.7-15.) Counsel for Ms. Munson told the district court Ms. Munson “has
surrendered her identity, her security, her job, her career, and a lot of her relationships, because
she considered the people at Pioneer her work family as well.” (4/28/17 Tr., p.62, Ls.10-14.)
The sentence imposed by the district court did not account in any way for Ms. Munson’s family,
and harms society as a whole by keeping Ms. Munson out of the workforce.
Unlike so many people convicted of crimes, Ms. Munson has no substance abuse issues,
and is actively working to address her mental health issues, which appear to stem from this case.
(PSI, pp.11, 12.)

The presentence materials reflect that Ms. Munson was diagnosed with

depression, anxiety, panic disorder, and PTSD in February 2017, but was receiving mental health
services regularly prior to sentencing. (PSI, pp.93-94.) Ms. Munson’s counselor, Jill Mitchell,
testified at sentencing that she believed Ms. Munson was making a genuine effort to get better.
(4/28/17 Tr., p.40, Ls.20-23, p.43, L.22 – p.44, L.13, p.45, Ls.10-13.) While incarcerated,
Ms. Munson will not receive the mental health services she needs, and is likely to have a greater
need for such services upon her release.
The district court received numerous letters attesting to Ms. Munson’s character and
requesting leniency at sentencing. (PSI, pp.32-64) Ms. Munson described herself as a “good
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person,” and told the district court she had been volunteering and mentoring others despite the
charges against her. (4/28/17 Tr., p.64, L.17 – p.65, L.6.) She explained to the district court that
“in [her] heart of hearts,” she never intended to steal, and said it “greatly pain[ed]” her to have let
down Joe Glaisyer, Chairman of the Board of Pioneer Title, and Mr. Bundgard. (4/28/17
Tr., p.63, L.16 – p.64, L.5; Tr., p.1776, Ls.4-8.) The sentence imposed by the district court did
not account for any of this positive information about Ms. Munson’s character.
Most importantly, the sentence imposed by the district court was not necessary to protect
the public interest. Our courts have recognized that “as a matter of policy . . . the primary
consideration [at sentencing] is the good order and protection of society.” State v. Toohill, 103
Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982) (quotation marks omitted). A term of confinement is thus
reasonable “to the extent it appears necessary, at the time of sentencing, to accomplish the
primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution applicable to a given case.” Id. The sentence imposed
upon Ms. Munson was not necessary for the good order and protection of society. In all
likelihood, incarcerating Ms. Munson will cause her, her family, and the entire community to be
less protected rather than more protected.
Prior to this case, Ms. Munson had never before been charged with, or convicted of, a
criminal offense. (PSI, p.5.) The presentence investigator determined Ms. Munson had an LSI
score of 7, and concluded she was “a good candidate for an order of probation.” (PSI, pp.12,
14.) Ms. McLure testified at sentencing that, in her opinion, Ms. Munson was not likely to
reoffend because she did not fit the profile of a typical embezzler. (4/28/17 Tr., p.37, Ls.16-21.)
Ms. Munson also voluntarily surrendered her CPA license prior to sentencing, further reducing
the likelihood of her reoffending. (4/28/17 Tr., p.51, L.25 – p.42, L.6.) As discussed above,
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Ms. Munson was employed prior to sentencing, and fully compensated Pioneer Title for all
losses the company suffered as a result of her actions. Counsel for Ms. Munson recommended a
withheld judgment and a term of probation of seven years. (4/28/17 Tr., p.57, Ls.19-20, p.62,
L.21 – p.63, L.2.) Considering the mitigating factors that exist in this case, and notwithstanding
the aggravating factors, the district court abused its discretion when it failed to follow this
recommendation, and instead sentenced Ms. Munson to an aggregate unified term of twenty
years, with four years fixed.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Munson respectfully requests that this Court vacate her conviction and remand this
case to the district court for a new trial. Alternatively, Ms. Munson requests that this Court
reduce her sentence as it deems appropriate, or remand this case to the district court for a new
sentencing hearing.
DATED this 16th day of August, 2018.
/s/ Andrea W. Reynolds
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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